The Russo-Ukraine War, a Wargamers Perspective
As a wargamer, I have conquered Russia a hundred times, and have repelled the Nazi's about the the same number of times. In the 80's, I built a corps level computer game on the topic, Road to Moscow. In the 90's I spent years working on the remake, down to the detail of company level. What is the attraction? Some say because it was the largest war ever. Others say because no matter which side you play, you get to beat up on the bad guy.
So I thought I knew what was going on with the latest war in Ukraine. And I was totally wrong on just about everything.
The size of the land hasn't changed, but the numbers of troops fighting are an order of magnitude smaller.
Russia started WWII with about 2.2 million men in the army. They started the Ukraine war with about 850,000 men under arms, but only 300,000 for the army, deploying 200,000 for the war. And with the level of corruption being revealed, these numbers may be overstatements. Ukraine started the war with an army and air force of around 200,000 men.
In a game of Russian Campaign, this would be like having 8 units fighting 6.
When the war was launched, the Russians attacked with 10 Armies.
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| Too many words. There has to be a picture. |
While the propaganda kept promoting the Russian failures at this time. For the most part, the 49th, 58th and the 8th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) and were successful in south Ukraine at achieving their objectives. One reason I have read for this was the 49th and the 58th had a large percentage of experienced troops, and performed competently. Once they achieved their objective, they pretty much were allowed to dig in. The 8th CAA, however is a relativity new formation, recruited from Separatists elements from the Donbas region. It performed poorly. Taking 3 months to capture it's main objective of the city of Mariupol, losing 6,000 dead in the process.
What is a Russian Combined Arms Army?
In WWII, an army would have from 5-12 divisions. 6 being pretty normal, plus supporting structures like supply, artillery and communications battalions. Today, to deal with asymmetric warfare, throwing divisions at a problem is just a waste of resources. The divisions still exist, and are fairly recognizable in formation to their WWII equivalent, but their purpose has changed. Their purpose now is to supply and support 1 or more Battalion Tactical Groups to an area. The BTG will be mostly mounted infantry, with integral support of armor and artillery. A tidy little package designed to take on insurgents over a wide area. In theory, a division could supply 9 of these into combat, but over the last decade, they were hard pressed to supply even 2.
In response, divisions were being decommissioned and replaced with brigades. Brigades will have from 2-6 battalions in total, and in theory could create 4 BTG's, though 1-2 in practice. But still represented less overhead than divisions, providing practically the same bang.
The first obvious problem with this is what if you run into a real division? How long will your BTG last in face of a regiment backed by a battalion of artillery? It's a bad accident waiting to happen.
And over the last few month's that is what I am reading. A Ukrainian brigade mauling BTG after BTG.
There is several reasons why the Russians have not been totally routed so far. One is that the Ukrainian Army, despite all the propaganda, is pretty much equipped as the Russians. And they don't have all that many brigades to fight with, and so pretty much have to split them up in battalions just to cover the ground. The second reason is, that for all its incompetency, the Russians have overwhelming numbers of artillery. And are fairly competent in it's use. This cannot be overstated. From the Ukrainian perspective, they cannot hold ground. If they do, the Russians will pound them. The Ukrainians have difficulty exploiting gaps in Russian lines. Because artillery can pound those gaps. Ukrainians are sensitive to casualties, the Russians are not.
Also, it seems, that while Russia seems to feel the need to need to attack, Ukraine does not at this time. Russian logistics are beyond their breakpoint for the little ground they have taken. Ukraine really is holding much the ground with trip wire defensive's. Many Ukrainian Brigades have been pulled out for reasons unknown. Probably training and up equipping. And when they show up, it will be bad for the Russians. Russian equipment losses are being made up for by digging ever deeper into the Soviet stockpile. Which has been poorly maintained over the decades.
Evidence of this is the missiles fired by their aircraft are sometimes 50 years old. The recent Ukrainian offensive has offered another hint at how deep the Russians have dug. A captured T-62 tank. Produced from 1961 to 1975. Implying they have worked their way through all the operational T-72's in their inventory of around 20,000.
A couple of months ago, Russia started running out of 122mm shells for their medium guns. And had to commission their 152's. With ammunition being now supplied by North Korea.
On Training and Conscription.
The latest call by Putin is to increase conscription by 300,000 men. But what will he get for this call up? Even before the war, the training cycle for conscripts was deceptive. Every six months, Russia would draft about 130,000 men, but only about 100,000 would actually be drafted, and according to one article I read, only about 70,000 complete the training and serve their year.
The Russian training system involves newly trained officers from school to train the platoon, 20-30 men, which they would command. This system has totally broken down due to the high officer casualties. Assuming Russia gets the 300,000 conscripts called for, there are not enough academy grads to train this flood of recruits. The answer of course is to pull veterans from the front lines to train the recruits. But the front lines are already greatly decimated and I am sure commanders would be unwilling to give any up.
How decimated?
For once, the word decimated seems a radical under statement. Some areas have battalion tactical groups (BTG) reporting only a 100 effectives out of 800. The good news is the BTG's were probably never up to strength. Instead of around 800, they may have started at around 500. And in dealing with realities on the ground, the official strength from captured documents has been down sized to around 340. See Here.
The total KIA's the Russians have suffered is subject to debate. Last month, Russian acknowledged 5,900 dead. Ukraine's estimate of Russian dead is 50,000. This is somewhat validated by this document that surfaced earlier in September:
It's in Russian of course. I am told it is an synopsis of the amount of money paid out to Russian families for killed members.The math is 361.9 billion rubles total, 7.4 million per fallen soldier, for 48,900 KIA's. The document may be real, but it is still suspect, not because it is falsified, but because of the layers of corruption in the whole system. Each layer can benefit for padding the numbers here. Where someone can add to the casualty list, and pocket the 7.4 million per. This document came out before the latest offensive by Ukraine.
The Ukrainians have claimed to have killed about 50,000 Russians. But that can be propaganda as well.
Estimates on Ukrainian dead range from 5,500 to 11,000.
Wounded estimates would be from 1 man invalided per dead and at least 2 men wounded, but recoverable per dead.
The War in the Sky
In theory, the Russians should have dominated the air war. This is again, applying western doctrine to an air-force that is not a western nation. The Russian doctrine in the air evolved in WWII, and frankly, has not altered much. In WWII, they would mass fighter bombers over the battlefield, supporting the troops. Casualties be damned. Their methods of dealing with German fighter aircraft relied on numbers. Their main tactic to defeat the Luftwaffe was to never stop fighting, wear it down, and eventually, drive a tank down the runway. Overall, the single purpose of the Russian Air force is to support the army.
Western air evolved concepts of trying to defeat the enemies structures supporting the air force. Be it industry, radars, air fields, etc. Why they evolved differently is environmental. The Soviets were nose to nose with the Germans. And if they drove two hundred miles, they would be in a position to put a tank on the end of a runway. The need for deep penetration bombers, and supporting long range fighters was simply not there.
In the west, for two years, the German bases were not vulnerable to ground attack, so different methodology evolved. When the Western Allies finally got to grips with the Wehrmacht, the doctrines of ground support for the troops had to be evolved whole cloth. While the Russians had been doing it for 3 years.
It's been 80 years since then. And frankly, neither side has changed their views on how to fight the air war. For the Russians, this means ground support. Occasionally, they send a bomber armed with "Less than precision" guided missiles to bomb a strategic target. Mostly striking things that couldn't possibly be the intended target. Of course, we only have the Ukrainians word on what was hit, and the Russians word of what the intended target was. But the point is, Russian deep penetration strike performance on Ukrainian infrastructure is lack-luster at best. Because that is not their doctrine. And the quality and the number of missiles seem to be limited.
In the initial phases of their offensive, the Russian air force was fairly active over the battlefield itself. Doing what they were trained to do, supporting the troops. YouTube is full of videos of Ukrainian missiles shooting down Russian craft in the early periods. About a hundred manned air craft in total. Mostly lost in low altitude strikes on Ukrainian positions. The difference between WWII and today is in WWII, the Soviets were producing Sturmoviks by the gross, while today, a single SU-35 costs 60 million dollars. Every loss is felt.
Rumor has it, that Russia needs to cannibalize civilian commercial products to get the IC chips needed to build their jets. Specifically Bosch dish washers looted from Ukrainian homes.
Ukrainian air losses are about the same as Russians in numbers. But for all the news of this-or-that country donating new Soviet equipment, little has been reported in actually showing up. Ukrainian fighters seem to be dedicated to air defense.
Drones
The details on the drone war will be the most interesting read when this war is over. Every country will study the results, most of which is still secret.
In reconnaissance, drones have proven invaluable. To be able to target real time, over the horizon targets cannot be understated. From interdicting supplies with a drone, a M777 howitzer at 18 miles, landing a shell on truck crossing a bridge. Or distracting a Russian flagship, allowing a couple of missiles blind side it to oblivion.
Ukraine has an indigenous drone company, formed by veterans of the 2014 War in the Donbas. They have been turning out "Punishers". Small, stealthy, carrying only 4.4 pounds of bombs, transportable in small boxes, but in the right location, have blown up helicopters, and ammo dumps. The unit cost is about $200,000. It is the weapon of choice for Ukrainian special forces.
Then there is the Bayraktar, medium-size drones, made in Turkey, costing about 2 million each. They can carry 300 pounds of munitions, and have been battle tested in Syria.
Russia has fallen behind so far in drone capability, they are buying them from Iran.
On Corruption
The effects of corruption has come to has been brought to light throughout this war. Tanks without reactive armor, supply deficiencies, reserve equipment left to rust, missiles that should have been combat worthy, were not, communications equipment not working, divisions only able to send 1 battalion into combat at 75% strength, training commands only training 53% of their yearly muster.
All evidence that if you were Putin's friend, you had a license to steal. If you were a friend of a friend of Putin, you could steal, but had to pay your share up the chain.
Creating an army, when put to the test, is failing badly everywhere.
The Putin Effect
Much is being said of Putin's interference in the war. More and more it is being said he is directing the army to do this or that. And this may be true. But there is a more subtle, and probably more pervasive problem of Putin's interference. Generals are not taking actions they know need to be done, without Putin's orders. An example is during the Ukrainian offensive earlier in September. All of us arm chair strategists looked at what was going on, and seeing disaster for the Ukrainians at every step. Their penetrations were too deep, not leaving troops to cover Russians they bypassed. The Russians need only leave their bases and close the door, trapping the Ukrainians behind enemy lines.
And that did not happen. The shock of the attacks paralyzed the Russian high command. They waited for orders from on high, and got nothing. So they hunkered down, and hoped for the best.
Today, Sept 27, Putin, apparently channeling Hitler from 1941, issued a no step back order for his army. He is relying on sending reinforcements to the front to stabilize things. One Russian soldier, was mobilized on the 21st, captured on the 27th.
How is it that Ukraine has not won the war yet?
First, no one expected Ukraine to go the distance. Probably they themselves are surprised. So in the beginning, the war was a desperate attempt to stop what Russian juggernaut with what equipment they had on hand. While dealing with mass migrations, and keeping the lights on against random Russian missile strikes.
It took time for the realities of the Russian army to manifest. But they still kept moving forward, and had to be responded to. The Ukrainians got real good at defensive warfare. As things stabilized, some Ukrainian units disappeared. Some still have yet to make an appearance. Others were cycled for rest and reequip, like the 92nd Mech Brigade. When the war movies are made, the 92nd will be center piece in them. That unit has been the bane of several Russian armies. It's commander will be their Patton.
But the question is, can Ukraine attack? And we had our answer this month, yes. But they still have to cautious. Ukraine is sensitive to casualties, and Russian artillery is still the key player to beat in this game.
But also, is Ukrainian success on the attack this month an indicator of their effectiveness? Or of Russian incompetence? Frankly, the force multipliers of Russian corruption, Putin's interference, and poor training levels is making Ukraine look like supermen.
The End Game:
What is the end game? Dangerous ground here to make predictions here. At this point, I think Ukraine is going to go for recovering all lost territory, including that lost in 2014. And not one square foot more. Crossing the Russian border would be a propaganda coup that Putin could capitalize on to legitimized full mobilization, and possibly authorize nuclear strikes. He is already trying to make claims of Ukrainian agents operating in Russia. No one believes him, but to provide actual proof is a different matter. Regardless of how well Ukraine is doing right now, they cannot conqueror Russia.
